IN 1932 SEATTLE-BASED photographer Asahel Curtis wrote an antiwar essay mocking the world’s penchant for conflict and the failure of peace organizations to prevent violence. The logic for his argument was simple: peace efforts have been futile, resulting in war; therefore a "league for the promotion of war" could bring peace. At the time he wrote this essay Curtis was well known in Washington for his excellent documentary photography, fervent support of Mount Rainier National Park, dedicated regional boosterism, and vigorous advocacy of improved streets and highways. This essay reveals that his private thoughts ranged far beyond such workaday endeavors.

In 1932 there was plenty for 58-year-old Curtis to worry about. The continuing, apparently unsolvable Great Depression severely curtailed his photography business. He was a faithful Republican at a time when that party had to shoulder the blame for causing and failing to cure the national economic disaster. The Republicans were almost certain to lose control of the presidency and become the minority party in the November elections. On the international scene the situation was no better. In Asia and the West, totalitarian governments threatened or used armed force despite the cooperation envisioned through the League of Nations, disarmament conferences, and nonaggression pacts.

Curtis did not write in an intellectual or emotional vacuum. By 1932 the United States was in the grip of a powerful reaction against participation in World War I and the international involvement it represented. Peace groups, scholarly studies of the war’s origins, and novels-e.g., Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms (1929)-all cautioned the public against war or any activities that could lead to war. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic victor in the 1932 presidential election, though not an isolationist, renounced his previous support for United States’ membership in the League of Nations.

Curtis’s essay is undated, but he likely wrote it in the spring or summer of 1932. "We have just had a war that wasn’t a war," he wrote, a probable reference to the "Shanghai incident" of early 1932 involving a Chinese-Japanese clash in and around Shanghai following Chinese protests over the Japanese takeover of Manchuria and related disturbances.

Shanghai was home to a large international settlement, so the brutality of the "incident" was widely circulated over the globe. Japan’s prestige never recovered from what was seen as its aggression, overreaction, and needless destruction of life and property. Total casualties (killed, wounded, missing in action) numbered about 13,000, a significant human toll for such a brief "incident." The property loss was severe, including the destruction of the Oriental Library-a trove of priceless manuscripts, paintings, and books-and China’s leading publishing house. Japan minimized the bitter urban battle, which is probably what prompted Curtis’s "war that wasn’t a war" comment.

Curtis wrote this essay with tongue firmly planted in cheek. He surely knew that no major nation would surrender its war-making power to a "league for the promotion of war," as his plan required. Yet the essay shows a Curtis who is more than merely cynical or pessimistic about the direction of events in the early 1930s. It conveys the hope that a supra-sovereign could enforce peace and the reasoned conviction that war is enormously expensive, scarcely glorious, and rarely produces its hoped-for results. His argument for fielding armies composed of the "aged, infirm, and unfit" could be seen as an affirmation of the observation that large-scale conflict destroys the best of a nation’s youthful ability and talent. The obvious cruelty of sending incompetents into battle could have been a swipe at the eugenics movement then still in vogue. The essay is informal because Curtis presents his proposal as that of a senator who, while campaigning for the presidency, is outlining his plan to a "friendly" newspaper. Part of the essay follows:


When I am President I am going to establish a League for the promotion of war. We have had Leagues for peace and we got war so I say let’s have a league for war and we may have peace! Anyway war has never been really organized or conducted on a business basis.... This League would have full charge of all wars and preparations for wars and this would save more than all the disarmament conferences can ever hope to. I would have all nations agree to leave their wars in charge of the League. If some of the nations did not agree, the War League could quickly convince them of their error.

Of course, there would be difficulties between some of the nations and some of them would want- to have a little private war.... When a nation wanted a private war, they could vote on how big a one they wanted. They would then deposit with the League this amount of money in gold, subject to draft for war expenses. They would also name the country with which they wanted to fight. If the nation they named could prove to the League that it could not afford a war, it would be permitted to draw on this same fund. Of course, if both nations drew on the same fund, it would lessen the duration of the war but the results would probably be as satisfactory....

Past wars have been fought on borrowed money, leaving posterity to pay the bills. I contend that this is basicly [sic] wrong. Posterity is going to have enough troubles of its own. To avoid this passing of the cost on to posterity, I propose...the payment of all bills as the war progresses and the closing of hostilities before all the funds are exhausted. Two of the most expensive features of all past wars have been pensions to disabled soldiers and their families and the payments to neutrals, for damages. To take care of this, I propose that twenty-five percent of the fund be set aside to settle claims of neutrals and that the full amount of a paid up life insurance policy for each combatant be deducted from the fund before hostilities begin.

In order that a war might have the proper dramatics, I propose that the War League have a navy with a skeleton personnel and enough trained officers to put an army in shape. Of course, as both nations would be served by these officers and ships, the results would be more satisfactory than the present arrangement because they would have a definite code for fighting the same as we now have in the prize ring. I feel that such a serious matter as war deserves as much thought and as careful planning as prize fighting.

If and when these financial preliminaries were arranged satisfactorily, the next matter for consideration would be the private soldiers and sailors. (All officers would be supplied by the League.) I consider that in the past we have approached this from the wrong point of view as we have all other war matters. I would select for the original draft those citizens of the least use to the nations. Perhaps we should begin with the national lawmakers; then the local or State officials. I would follow this with the prisoners in the Federal penitentiaries, state penitentiaries and local jails. If this did not provide a sufficient force, I would take the old and infirm to supplement the force. The loss of life would probably not be so great because the fighting might be devoid of pep but with both sides similarly equipped, the results would be as satisfactory as with a more vigorous force. Then too, the loss of these men would not be as severe a blow to the nations as would the loss of the young men. Rather, by this plan we might even improve the race through the elimination of the aged, infirm and unfit.

Of course, members of Parliament or Congressmen and Senators might be reluctant to vote for war, knowing that they would be among the first to participate but this hesitancy should not seriously interfere with the welfare of any nation.

I believe that by determining in advance how much they were willing to spend to "save face" and having to get the money together in advance, the nations would have an opportunity to consider the seriousness of war. When they had the money ready they might even find something else they would rather do with it.


Curtis’s antiwar essay was unpublished and probably never circulated very far among his associates. Because it was both isolationist in its rejection of international peace organizations and interventionist in its proposal for a global "War League," it was bound to offend both isolationists and interventionists. It is a tract of its times, but a novel one in its inversion of the standard "peace" or avoidance of war solution in favor of a league to enforce rigorous standards of war. Perhaps his best suggestion was this: if countries had to pay the full cost of a war in advance, they might realize their money would be better spent elsewhere.


William H. Wilson is an independent historian living in Seattle. His current interest is the life and work of Asahel Curtis